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Abstract. Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade led to large 
capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the Northern countries of the euro 
area towards the Southern part. Since the start of the crisis and more markedly after 2009, these flows have 
suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment pressures. At this point, the common monetary policy can only try to 
mitigate the unavoidable adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate 
balance between providing liquidity for solvent institutions while keeping the overall pressure on for a rapid 
correction of the imbalances. 
he general point of this paper is 
straightforward: there is little a common 
monetary policy (or macro prudential 
tools) can do to affect directly the correction of 
existing macroeconomic imbalances. In the euro 
area, imbalances were built up over the last 
decade as massive capital flows moved from the 
North to the South of the Monetary Union. Their 
legacy is a debt overhang which leads to financial 
market distress. The details of the debt overhang 
vary from country to country, but one can 
distinguish two groups: In Spain and Ireland, 
foreign capital was used to sustain massive 
construction booms. In Greece and Portugal, 
foreign capital was used to finance consumption. 
Italy seems to be a special case as it did not 
experience a pronounced credit boom, but its low 
growth rates has made a pre-existing large stock 
of public debt appear less and less sustainable in 
the long run. 
The expansion in domestic demand financed by 
the capital inflows was the main reason why 
Southern euro area countries became 
uncompetitive. Their loss of competitiveness was 
thus a symptom, rather than an independent 
additional cause for the present imbalances. This 
implies that unless exports pick up significantly, 
the re-balancing has to come through lower 
domestic demand, which inevitably lead to lower 
GDP. Moreover, given that the debt accumulated 
during the boom years is very large, the 
adjustment is likely to take a long time.    
Introduction 
During the first decade after the start of EMU, the 
euro area and more broadly the global economy 
experienced an unprecedented credit boom. The 
expansion of credit was particularly robust in the 
Southern countries: Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
as well as in Ireland. The difficulties these 
countries are now experiencing are the 
consequence of a ‘sudden stop’ in the private 
capital flows they became accustomed to 
receiving during the boom years. 
Market financing, which had been excessively 
abundant until 2009 for both governments and 
the private sector, suddenly dried up during 
2010, and the government of Greece and later of 
Ireland and Portugal were no longer able to fund 
themselves at any sustainable price.  
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One question that is often asked why did 
financial markets, which had provided Greece 
with ample financing over years when its current 
account deficits and the (approximate) size of its 
public debt were well known, suddenly review 
their position almost out of the blue.  
The answer must be that markets did not realise 
that the behaviour of investors affects the so-
called fundamentals. In Southern Europe growth 
was strong during the boom years because of the 
capital inflows.  For example, Greek GDP, as well 
as that of Ireland and Spain, was growing in 
nominal terms by over 7% while nominal (long-
term) interest rates were around 4%.  The 
countries thus had a higher growth rate than the 
interest rate they were paying and thus appeared 
solvent.  The problem was that investors did not 
stop to calculate what the growth would be if the 
capital inflows stopped.  Indeed when the crisis 
broke, nominal (actual and expected) growth 
rates became much smaller or even negative.  At 
the same time market interest rates rose along 
with a generalised increase in risk aversion.  As a 
result the growth rate – interest rate differential 
turned around by a large margin and the 
countries no longer appeared solvent – which 
reinforced the capital flight. (See Alcidi & Gros 
(2011) for more details.)  
Moreover, the Southern countries had 
accumulated a large stock of foreign debt, which 
nervous investors in Northern Europe (and 
elsewhere) are no longer willing to hold. This is 
the nature of the ‘euro crisis’.  
On key crucial questions now is about how to 
correct imbalances, how to share the burden of 
the adjustment and what is the role of the 
European Institutions, foremost the ECB, in this 
process.
The remainder of this Policy Brief is organised as 
follows. Section 1 identifies macroeconomic 
imbalances, focusing on intra-euro area current 
account disequilibria and the role of 
competitiveness. Section 2 briefly assesses the role 
of the common monetary policy and the 
monetary transmission mechanisms in the build-
up of the imbalances. Section 3 introduces the 
possible role of the ECB and the ESRB in the 
process of rebalance and potential sources of 
inconsistency. The last section concludes. 
1. Macroeconomic imbalances and the EIP 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, and even 
more after the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro area, a lot attention has been devoted to 
macroeconomic imbalances. Within the euro area, 
macroeconomic imbalances refer to the existence 
of disequilibria in the external position, i.e. the 
current account of member countries, vis-à-vis 
each other, rather than to the position of the 
entire area vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
The major imbalance within the euro area is the 
one arising between the group of countries with a 
current account surplus, mostly North of the Alps 
and rated AAA by the major ratings agencies, and 
the countries with current account deficits, mostly 
South of the Alps, with the exception of Ireland.  
Figure 11 shows that that the current account of 
the entire euro area has remained roughly in 
balance since the start of EMU, but after 2001 the 
balances of the North and South behave like 
mirror images of each other with movements of 
opposite sign. 
                                                      
1 The two groups are simply defined according to the 
common behaviour of the current account balance since 
the creation of the EMU. The North eurozone includes 
Austria, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands & 
Finland, countries which had current account surplus 
each year (or almost) over the period 2000-10. By contrast 
South eurozone includes Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland & 
Portugal, which displayed a deficit every year (or 
almost). France is intentionally left out as its current 
account behaviour exhibits a mixed feature, surplus over 
the period 2000-05 and deficit afterwards. Holinski et al. 
(2012) use cluster analysis to identity two different 
groups of countries and end up with similar conclusion. 
The main difference is Italy which according to their 
results is in a position similar to the one of France (i.e. not 
sharing clearly the features of either group). 3 | D
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One cannot interpret the imbalances in Figures 2 
directly as bilateral imbalances between the 
North and the South of the euro area, since there 
is a global capital market and the current account 
is always ‘erga omnes’. However, the close 
negative correlation in the flows suggests a link. 
In reality, the link might be due to the structure of 
financial markets in the savings-rich Northern 
eurozone countries. There most of the excess 
savings is intermediated by the banking system 
and other highly regulated intermediaries 
(insurance companies, pension funds, etc.). These 
intermediaries have a strong ‘home bias’, or 
rather a bias towards investing in the euro area. 
For financial intermediaries, most regulations 
impose limits on investments outside the euro 
area or non-euro denominated. For small savers, 
investment in the home currency is always the 
first choice. This implies that, under normal 
conditions, there is a strong propensity for the 
excess savings in the North of the euro area to be 
invested elsewhere in the euro area itself. In this 
sense, one can speak of a flow of resources 
running from North to South since the 
introduction of the single currency. 
Since 2009, however, private cross-border flows 
have reverted suddenly and since the start of the 
euro crisis a massive withdrawal of foreign 
private resources has taken place in the South of 
the euro area. Adjusting to this sudden stop in the 
inflows of capital that benefited South eurozone 
countries for years is the key task at present. 
Without the previous capital inflows that had 
financed construction (in Spain and Ireland), and 
consumption (in Greece and Portugal and to a 
lesser extent Italy), Southern euro area countries 
are now forced to cut both construction 
investment and consumption, with large negative 
effects on GDP and unemployment, as shown in 
Figure 3 below. By contrast, the Northern 
eurozone countries benefit from very benign 
financial conditions, which keep their growth 
rates up and employment down. 
Figure 3. Unemployment and growth 
  
Data Source: European Commission Services. 
The fact that the current account of the entire euro 
area remains broadly balanced means that the 
euro area, taken as a whole, has sufficient 
resources to fund the financial needs of all the 
countries of the eurozone, including those of the 
governments running large deficits. But why a 
‘euro crisis’, if enough ‘domestic’ resources exist 
to deal with it? The key problem is the 
distribution of savings within the euro area.  
As documented above, large savings are available 
in the north of the Alps but, savers from core 
eurozone countries no longer are willing ‘to cross 
the Alps’ to finance southern countries such as 
Italy, Spain and Greece. This is the essential 
reason why the South is experiencing a financial 
crisis while, at the same time, financial conditions 
in Germany remain benign and the German 
government could issue short-term paper at zero 
or negative rates.  
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Current account imbalances rarely occur in 
isolation. It is thus difficult to keep them 
separated from the accompanying fiscal and 
competitiveness issues. Here we will focus on the 
link between current account imbalances and 
competitiveness divergence.  
How to manage the adjustment: The role of 
competitiveness 
The official diagnosis of the current account 
imbalances within the euro area is quite simple: 
the South let its competitiveness deteriorate via 
unjustified wage increase, whereas the North 
(Germany in primis) kept costs under control and 
became more competitive. However, this 
diagnosis provides at best a partial explanation of 
the run-up to the crisis and is seriously 
incomplete, if taken in isolation, as a guide for 
policy.  
Divergences in competitiveness within the euro 
area have been central to the policy debate for 
some time now. The former President of the ECB, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, is said to have shown at each 
meeting of the European Council over the past 
several years a chart showing the divergence in 
unit labour costs (ULC) among euro area member 
countries. This has apparently struck a responsive 
chord in policy-makers. The new Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP) – introduced by the 
European Commission as part of the large 
package of changes to the economic governance 
of the eurozone in 2010 – contains within its 
‘Scoreboard’ (see Box 1), two competiveness 
indicators as key elements: relative unit labour 
costs and consumer prices (relative to a large 
number of industrial countries). One legacy of the 
euro crisis thus is that competitiveness indicators 
now play a key role in the economic governance 
of the eurozone. 
In the ‘Scoreboard for the Surveillance of 
Macroeconomic Imbalances’ (2012), the European 
Commission emphasises that the indicators are 
neither policy targets nor policy instruments. 
Rather, in the alert mechanism, the results of the 
scoreboard are interpreted from an economic 
perspective with a view to identifying 
developments in member states that may point to 
a risk of imbalances and therefore require further 
in-depth analysis. 
 
Box 1. Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances 
The initial scoreboard consists of a set of ten indicators with indicative thresholds. Two indicators aim 
at monitoring external positions, three indicators capture competitiveness developments and the 
subsequent five indicators reflect internal imbalances.  
1.  three-year backward moving average of the current account balance as a percent of GDP, with a 
threshold of +6% and - 4%; 
2.  net international investment position as a percent of GDP, with a threshold of -35%; 
3.  five-year percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a threshold of -6%; 
4.  three-year percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for euro-area 
countries and +12% for non-euro-area countries, respectively; 
5.  three-year percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on HICP/CPI deflators, 
relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5% for euro area countries and -
/+11% for non-euro-area countries, respectively; 
6.  private sector debt as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 160%; 
7.  private sector credit flow as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 15%; 
8.  year-on-year changes in the house price index relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, with a 
threshold of 6%; 
9.  general government sector debt as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 60%; and 
10. three-year backward moving average of the unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10%. 
Source: European Commission Occasional Paper No. 92, February 2012. MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EURO AREA | 6 
 
The idea behind the IEP is to use these indicators 
as potential warning signals and then to force 
member countries to take 'remedial action' should 
these indicators signal ‘excessive imbalances’.  
However, t this obsession with competitiveness is 
unlikely to lead to better policies. There are 
several reasons for this: 
1.  It is difficult to determine the right or 
‘equilibrium’ level of competitiveness. 
2.  The link between competitiveness and exports 
3.  Wage costs are determined in labour markets, 
not by government fiat => governments can 
do little in the short run to affect 
competitiveness.  
4.  Wage costs are determined in labour markets 
=> competitiveness is endogenous. 
We now discuss each aspect in turn. 
What is the equilibrium level of competitiveness? 
A first point is that competitiveness, usually 
measured as a relative unit labour cost (ULC), is a 
relative concept. The gain of one country is the 
loss of another. Hence restoring the 
competitiveness of a member country (e.g. 
Greece) implies deterioration for others 
(Germany in the first instance): the adjustment 
might come about either through wage increases 
in the lower labour cost countries or cuts in those 
with a too high cost. There is a consensus that no 
country should be forced to increase wages and 
everybody gains if structural reforms increase 
productivity, but this does not change the 
fundamental fact that if German wages increase 
(relative to productivity), intra-eurozone 
divergence is reduced by definition. Indeed this is 
what is happening now. 
A second point is that it is always difficult to 
determine the proper base year for the 
competitiveness index. It is usually assumed that 
the start of EMU is an equilibrium and hence the 
best base, but there is no actual economic ground 
for it. When EMU started Germany had a current 
account deficit and it was widely accepted at the 
time that it had entered the euro at an overvalued 
exchange rate, and that in a monetary union 
would have had hard time to regain 
competitiveness.2  
                                                      
2 See Wyplosz (1999). 
The chart on the left hand side of Figure 4 shows 
the evolution of the ULC in some euro area 
countries, assuming that 1999 is the base year, 
while the chart on the right hand side shows the 
same index re-scaled dividing it by its average 
over the period 1995-2010 to remove the biased 
induced by the choice of the base year. The 
comparison suggests that 1999 might not have 
been equilibrium itself. When the long-term 
average is taken as equilibrium concept, 2003 
appears to be year of the smallest cross-country 
differences. It also emerges that prior to 2003 
Germany was one of the countries with lowest 
competitiveness (many countries were below the 
100 line), while after 2003, the countries that have 
experienced a significant loss in competitiveness 
are those where bubbles had developed, e.g. 
Ireland and Spain (see Gros, 2010).3 Importantly, 
the consequence of a bias in the base year is a bias 
in the measurement of the divergence. Any 
analyses based on 1999 as equilibrium year will 
conclude that countries now in difficulties have 
lost about 25-30% in terms of ULC relative to 
Germany, while using the long term average as 
equilibrium concept suggests a loss of about 15%, 
a substantially smaller estimate of the remaining 
divergence. The purpose of these simple 
considerations is not to show that unambiguously 
2003 should be taken as proper base year, but 
how difficult it is in practice to measure 
divergences in competitiveness.  
 
                                                      
3 See Gros (2010) Adjustment Difficulties in the GIPSY club, 
CEPS Working Document No. 326. 7 | D
Fig
Not
Sou
 
Do
A m
the
ind
suc
com
at 
Fig
Sou
DANIEL GROS
gure 4. Real H
year 1
te: ECB EER-20
rce: ECB Statis
oes competit
more funda
e usefulnes
dicators is t
ccess is ra
mpetitivene
least lower
gure 5. Expor
rce: European
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
AT
SP
GR
PT
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
%
 
o
f
 
E
U
2
7
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
S 
Harmonized 
1999, RHS: r
0 group of cur
stical Warehou
tiveness dete
amental rea
s of the st
that their p
ather low. 
ess should l
r market sh
rts of goods a
n Commission 
BE
FI
IT
IE
Irelan
Spain
 Competitive
re-scaled to a
rrencies and eu
use and own c
ermine expo
ason to be s
tandard co
power to p
In princip
lead to low
hares. Given
and services 
 Services (Am
DE
FR
NL
nd
n
eness indicat
average 1995
uro area 17 co
computations
ort success?
ceptical abo
ompetitiven
predict exp
ple a loss 
wer exports,
n that all f
 and competi
meco database)
Greece
Portugal
tor: unit labo
5-2005  
 
ountry currenc
. 
? 
out 
ness 
port 
of 
 or 
five 
co
de
co
pr
rev
 
tiveness vs. 
 
. 
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
‐3
our cost (ULC
cies. 
untries of 
eficits, it s
mpetitivene
oblems. H
veals that th
 market share
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
AT
SP
GR
B
Gree
Cypr
Italy
France
A
Finl
30 ‐20 ‐
%C h a n g
in Nom
C) in total ec
  the South
seems obv
ess must re
owever, a 
his is not ne
e (MIP 2011
BE
FI
IT
Belgium
Germany
Eston
Ireland
ce
Spain
rus
y
e
L
Netherland
s
ustria
Portugal
Slovenia
land
‐5
0
5
10
15
20
‐10 0
ge(3 years)  
minal ULC
 
conomy. LHS
h have cu
vious that 
eside at the
closer loo
ecessarily th
) 
DE
FR
NL
nia
uxembour
g
Malta d
y = 0.07x +
R² = 0.0
10 20
S: ULC base 
urrent acco
their loss 
e core of th
k at the d
he case. 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Slovakia
+ 9.1
04
30 40
% Change 
(5 years) 
in Export 
Market Shares
 
 
ount 
  of 
heir 
data 
 
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EURO AREA | 8 
 
A first problem with the standard view is that the 
most important and immediate consequence of a 
loss of competitiveness should be lower exports. 
But the evolution of the export market shares 
does not support this hypothesis. Figure 5, on the 
left had side, shows the share of the exports of 
goods and services of each country in overall EU-
27 exports: all lines are essentially flat and not 
downwards sloping as one would expect. The 
only exception is Italy, the country which 
experienced the lowest loss of competitiveness. 
The relatively strong export performance of these 
supposedly ‘uncompetitive’ economies raises the 
question: where do their deficits come from? The 
easy answer is an excess on the import side: 
excessive domestic spending, consumption in 
Greece and Portugal (and to some extent Italy) 
and construction in Spain and Ireland could be 
responsible. 
However, for most of the GIPS, the balance of 
trade (in goods and services) has actually 
improved between 2000 and 2010. This suggests 
that in a country starting with a large imbalance, 
not only exports need to grow significantly, but 
much more than imports for the trade balance to 
improve. In the case specific case of Greece the 
current account was already in large deficit when 
the country joined the euro and the trade balance 
changed little between 2000 and 2010 (despite the 
huge increase in relative ULC), but the current 
account did not improve because other flows 
turned negative (income, unilateral transfer and 
transfers from the EU). The negative impact on 
the income balance is explained by the huge 
accumulation of foreign debt which the country 
has to service. This provides evidence that a 
country which has run large deficits for a long 
time cannot simply return to the ‘status quo ante’, 
but must actually run a surplus on goods and 
services in order to service its debt. 
The real challenge for countries with a large 
foreign debt materializes when financing 
conditions deteriorate and a larger part of income 
must be devoted to service the external debt– 
whatever the situation in terms of the usual 
competitiveness indicators. 
 
Competitiveness is not a policy variable 
Policy discussions about competitiveness suffer 
usually from one key oversight: EU member 
countries are not centrally planned economies. 
There is little a government can do in a market 
economy to force lower wages in the private 
sector. Governments can of course enforce wage 
cuts in the public sector. This has been done in 
almost all EU countries and most notably in 
Latvia, Greece, Ireland and Spain for example, 
but there is little empirical evidence that public 
sector wage trends have an economically 
significant impact on wage growth in the private 
sector.4 The most recent data show that nominal 
wages have fallen in the year 2010 in the Baltic 
countries and in Ireland, while in 2011 only in 
Ireland and Greece. 
Competitiveness is endogenous 
The view that a loss of competitiveness 
constitutes the root cause of the difficulties in the 
periphery must somehow start from the 
proposition that wage costs are some an 
exogenous variable. However, while many 
countries have a ‘wage policy’, labour costs are in 
the end mostly determined by the interaction of 
demand and supply in the labour market. 
Figure 6 shows a strong correlation between 
domestic demand and labour cost. The countries 
which have experienced the largest expansion in 
domestic demand are the same who have also see 
the largest loss in competiveness. 
On this ground, one may argue that, if labour 
markets are allowed to work, the losses of 
competitiveness, observed during the boom 
phase, should reverse themselves over time 
during the burst.  
Data suggest that after 2010 domestic demand has 
strengthened (or better, is less weak) in the 
surplus countries. This should imply that over 
time the labour markets in these countries should 
tighten leading to relatively larger wage 
increases. The opposite should occur in the South. 
This is the kind of process that will lead to a fall 
in labour cost divergences.  
                                                      
4 See Lamo et al. (2008) for empirical studies that find 
econometrically significant effects, but the orders of 
magnitude remain so small that any politically feasible 
autonomous change in public wages would have only a 
negligible impact on private sector wages. 9 | DANIEL GROS 
 
 
Figure 6. Correlation between domestic demand and ULC 
 
Note: ULC is nominal unit labour costs: total economy (ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed.) 
Source: European Commission Services (Ameco). 
 
2. Common monetary policy and the 
build-up of the imbalances 
The decisive driving factor behind the build-up of 
the imbalances was a global credit boom 
sustained by a high level of risk appetite 
throughout global financial markets. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one can also claim 
that the stance of the common monetary policy 
was too expansionary for too long. But we would 
argue that this was not the main reason for the 
excessive expansion in consumption and 
construction that occurred in some countries. It 
was rather the fact that monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms have worked 
differently in different countries due to large 
differences in the financial structure of different 
member states. 
The argument goes beyond the Walters’ critique, 
which starts from the observation that the 
common monetary policy is bound to be more 
expansionary in countries where inflation is high 
and more contractionary where inflation rates are 
low because the real interest rate is lower in the 
former and higher in the latter.  
In our view the problem was not so much about 
inflation differential but about credit conditions. 
Figure 7 gives an example of the differences 
across groups of member states in credit 
conditions by looking at lending for house 
purchases.  
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Figure 7. Interest rates on lending for house purchase 
 
Source: ECB. 
During the years of the credit boom, average 
interest rates on mortgages actually paid by 
borrowers in Ireland and Spain (blue line) were 
much lower relative to Germany and Northern 
Europe in general (green line). The reason for this 
is that in Ireland and Spain most mortgages were 
at floating rates, linked to short-term rates (like 
three month LIBOR) whereas in Germany most 
mortgages are at fixed long-term rates, which 
remained usually 2-3 percentage points higher.  
To this one should add that also credit access was 
different across countries, while in Germany and 
Northern Europe, mortgages are usually limited 
to 60% of the value of the house, in Spain and 
Ireland loan-to-value ratios of 100% became 
increasingly common. 
For a more detailed examination of the monetary 
transmission mechanisms within the euro area, 
see Gros (2011). 
3. The role of the ECB and the ESRB 
There is little the common monetary policy can 
do to reduce the imbalances which were built up 
over almost a decade. However, the ECB can 
mitigate the costs of adjustment by safeguarding 
financial stability. 
The ECB is of course not the only institution 
concerned with financial stability. According to 
the ESRB Regulation: “The ESRB shall be 
responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system within the Union in order to 
contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic 
risks to financial stability in the Union that arise from 
developments within the financial system and taking 
into account macro-economic developments, so as to 
avoid periods of widespread financial distress.” 
It is now too late to ‘avoid periods of widespread 
financial distress’, but the work of the ESRB is 
still very relevant in the sense that it can point out 
the areas where distress might become most acute 
as the adjustment process takes it course. 
A problem that is unavoidable in this context is 
that, given the existing imbalances, the dangers to 
financial stability are usually specific to a limited 
number of countries. This implies that an 
institution like the ESRB will have to call for 
action at the national level, including country 
specific differences in the application of financial 
market regulation. This conflicts of course with 
the aim of establishing a ‘single rule book’, or in 
general the aim of establishing a ‘level playing 
field’ within the internal market. Institutionally, 
the conflict is thus between the ECB/ESRB and 
the Commission. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
During the first decade after the start of EMU, the 
euro area and more broadly the global economy 
experienced an unprecedented credit boom. The 
expansion of credit was particularly robust in the 
Southern countries. The difficulties these 
countries are now experiencing are the 
consequence of a ‘sudden stop’ in the private 
capital flows they became accustomed to 
receiving during the boom years. 
In this Policy Brief, we argue that the expansion 
in domestic demand financed by the capital 
inflows was the main reason behind the loss of 
competitiveness in the Southern euro area 
countries.  
Uncontrolled demand expansion based on credit 
inflows is the main source of the current 
imbalances. Alas, years of accumulation of flows 
have generated a large stock problem, mostly 
debt, which has to be corrected. For the correction 
to happen, the main effort has to come inevitably 
from individual countries. European Institutions, 
i.e. the European Commission, the ECB and the 
ESRB, can only affect the process marginally. The 
Commission can provide member states with 
guidance on how to achieve the re-balance and 
cope with its effects on the real economy. The 
ESRB can contribute to the mitigation of systemic 
risk within the financial sphere arising from 
macroeconomic developments. Last but not least, 
the ECB can contribute to contain financial 
instability and avert disruptions in the financial 
sector.  
Given the heterogeneity of the crisis within the 
euro area and the country specificities, the main 
risk is that a conflict emerges between internal 
market rules and the need for measures adapted 
to individual countries.  
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